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Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith :
Form Over Substance?
Deborah V. Dunn and Domingo P. Such, III*
A. BACKGROUND

OF

FIDELITY-PHILADELPHIA TRUST CO. V. SMITH

In 1934, Mary H. Haines, age seventy-six, purchased three single
premium, nonrefundable life annuities (“Annuities”), and three life insurance policies with face values totaling $350,000 (“Policies”).1 Interestingly, Ms. Haines could only purchase the Policies if she also
purchased the Annuities contemporaneously; she could have purchased
the Annuities independently.2 Each Annuity’s payment stream was calculated so that the risk to the insurance companies of paying the Annuities beyond Ms. Haines’s expected lifetime was fully hedged by the
delayed payment of the death benefits from the Policies, and correspondingly, the risk of paying the death benefits prematurely was fully
hedged by the shorter annuity obligations.3
The beneficiaries of the Policies were Ms. Haines’s children, or if a
child predeceased her, the child’s interest would be transferred to the
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company, as trustee of a trust established by
Ms. Haines (“Trust”).4 Shortly after the purchase, Ms. Haines transferred two Policies to her children and one Policy to the Trust, and paid
gift tax on the transfers.5 In 1938, she amended the Trust to make it
irrevocable and thereafter owned no beneficial or reversionary interest
in the Trust or the Policies.6
Ms. Haines died in 1946, and the Policies’ proceeds were not reported as part of her estate.7 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
assessed a deficiency, which was paid, and thereafter Ms. Haines’s executors claimed a refund which was granted in United States District
* Deborah V. Dunn is a partner with Ahrens DeAngeli Law Group in Boise,
Idaho. Domingo P. Such III is a partner and the firmwide Co-Chair of Family Office
Services with Perkins Coie LLP in Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Such is an ACTEC Fellow. The
authors thank William J. Whitaker, a partner with Ahrens DeAngeli Law Group, for his
valuable assistance in researching and drafting the commentary.
1 Fid.-Philadelphia Tr. Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 275 (1958).
2 Id. at 275-76.
3 Id. at 275.
4 Id. at 276.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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Court, but reversed by the United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.8 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.9
The issue before the Court was whether the Policies’ proceeds
should be included in Ms. Haines’s estate under the precursor to section
2036(a)(1),10 which required inclusion of property transferred by the decedent without adequate consideration with respect to which the decedent retained for life the possession, enjoyment or right to income from
the property.11
The I.R.S., citing Helvering v. Le Gierse,12 argued that the Annuities’ payments were retained “income” from the Policies previously
transferred.13 Ms. Haines’s executors argued that (1) the annuity payments were from the Annuities, not the Policies, (2) the Policies were
separate property, and (3) no interest in the Policies was retained because all interests in the Policies had been assigned away by Ms.
Haines.14
In holding Ms. Haines had not “retained income from” the Policies
and thus ruling in favor of the estate,15 the Fidelity-Philadelphia Court
distinguished Le Gierse for two reasons. First, Ms. Haines divested herself of all rights in the Policies, whereas the donor in Le Gierse retained
all rights in the life insurance policies.16 Second, the cases were decided
under two different statutory schemes; the precursor to section
2036(a)(1) in Fidelity-Philadelphia, and the precursor to section 2037 in
Le Gierse.17 More importantly, the Fidelity-Philadelphia Court dismissed the aggregation of the Annuities and Policies and stressed their
independence.18
8 Id.; Fid.-Philadelphia Tr.Co. v. Smith, 241 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir. 1957) (finding the
taxpayer’s argument “exalts form over substance,” which language is adopted as part of
the title of this Commentary).
9 Fid.-Philadelphia Tr. Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 274, 276 (1958).
10 Sections noted herein are to the Internal Revenue Code unless otherwise
specified.
11 Id. at 275, 277. The relevant statute at the time of Mrs. Haines’s death was I.R.C.
§ 811(c)(1)(B) (1939). See Fid. -Philadelphia Tr. Co. v. Smith, 142 F. Supp. 561, 563 n.2
(E.D. Pa. 1956).
12 Fid.-Philadelphia Tr.t Co., 356 U.S. at 277-79 (citing 312 U.S. 531, 542 (1941)). Le
Gierse was decided on similar facts, except the decedent owned the policy at death. The
Court held the proceeds of the policy were taxable “as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death” under the precursor to I.R.C. § 2037. The relevant
statute under Helvering v. Le Gierse was I.R.C. § 811(c)(1)(C) (1939). See Fid.-Philadelphia Tr. Co., 142 F. Supp. at 563 n.2.
13 Fid.-Philadelphia Tr. Co., 356 U.S. at 277.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 280-81.
16 Id. at 278.
17 Id. at 279.
18 Id. at 280.
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The Court placed significant emphasis on the Policies and Annuities not being aggregated. In finding independence, the Court held that
Ms. Haines had not “retained income from” the Policies by receiving
payments from the Annuities.19
The I.R.S. followed Fidelity-Philadelphia in Revenue Ruling 65-69
by holding life insurance proceeds from annuity/insurance contract combinations are “not includible in the gross estate of the insured under
section 2036(a)”20 where the insurance policy and all rights to proceeds
have been irrevocably assigned by the insured.
B. SIMILAR TRANSACTION MAY CAUSE INCLUSION
UNDER SECTION 2039
What if the I.R.S. could have argued for inclusion under section
2039 in Fidelity-Philadelphia? Section 2039 requires inclusion of the
value of a payment or annuity receivable by anyone for having survived
the decedent “under any form of contract or agreement entered into
after March 3, 1931 (other than as insurance under policies on the life of
the decedent)” if, under the arrangement, the payment or annuity was
payable to the decedent.21
Could the Policies’ proceeds be considered an “other payment receivable” under section 2039, and if so, are they “insurance” proceeds
that avoid inclusion under the section 2039 parenthetical described
above?
The Tax Court held inclusion under section 2039 was warranted in
Montgomery v. Commissioner.22 Montgomery, like Fidelity-Philadelphia, involved annuity/life insurance contracts issued contemporaneously on one life where the insurance company bore no risk.23 In
holding the insurance proceeds includible under section 2039, the Montgomery Court distinguished Fidelity-Philadelphia because Ms. Haines’s
death predated section 2039.24 Importantly, the Tax Court aggregated
several contracts together, rather than treating them as distinct transactions, calling them “an integrated step transaction.”25 Based on section
2039, Montgomery and other authority,26 the I.R.S. has arguments for
19

Id. at 281.
Rev. Rul. 65-69, 1965-1 C.B. 441.
21 I.R.C. § 2039. This provision was enacted after Mrs. Haines’s death.
22 56 T.C. 489 (1971).
23 Id. at 492.
24 Id. at 496-97.
25 Id. at 494.
26 See, e.g., Sussman v. United States, No. 74-C-1161, 1975 WL 799, at *1 (E.D. N.Y.
Dec. 31, 1975); Frederick K. Hoops, Frederick H. Hoops III & Daniel S. Hoops, Combination Life Insurance and Annuity, in 1 FAM. EST. PLAN. GUIDE § 21:3 (4th ed.); David
Westfall & George P. Mair, Inclusion of Transfers Made within Three Years of Trans20
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inclusion in cases involving life insurance/annuity contract combinations
similar to Fidelity-Philadelphia.
C. ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE
The Fidelity-Philadelphia Court reached its conclusion by describing the Policies and Annuities as being independent in two distinct ways:
First, by describing the divisibility in ownership and assignability
(“Ownership Divisibility”) of the Annuities and Policies;27 and second,
by describing the divisibility in obligations (“Obligation Divisibility”)
arising under the Annuities and Policies.28 The Court elaborated on
Obligation Divisibility by citing various cases for the proposition that
there should be no inclusion under the precursor to section 2036(a)(1) if
the right of the transferor to receive payments is “a personal obligation
of the transferee” and “not chargeable to the transferred property,” and
where “the size of the payments is not determined by the size of the
actual income from the transferred property at the time the payments
are made.”29
In arguing whether section 2036(a)(1) should apply, Obligation Divisibility should be the focus, not Ownership Divisibility. A remainderman’s ability to independently own and assign his or her interest
presently is irrelevant to an analysis of section 2036(a)(1); what matters
is whether the transferor retained the right to income from such property. Accordingly, the less the income stream is tied to the property
transferred, the less likely that section 2036(a)(1) applies.
Nonetheless, even with both Ownership Divisibility and Obligation
Divisibility present, inclusion may still apply. Consider the purchase of
feror’s Death, 1 EST. PLAN. L. & TAX. § 8.05 (4th ed. 2001 & Supp. 2016-1); The Life
Insurance and Annuity Combination Policy, 41 IND. L.J. 725 (1966), http://www.reposito
ry.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3658&context=ilj (last visited Dec. 2,
2016).
27 Fid.-Philadelphia Tr. Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 280 (1958) (“The annuity policy
could have been acquired separately, and the life insurance policy could have been, and
was, conveyed separately.”).
28 Id. (“The annuities arose from personal obligations of the insurance companies
which were in no way conditioned on the continued existence of the life insurance contracts . . . [and] would have continued unimpaired and without diminution in size
throughout the life of the insured even if the life insurance policies had been
extinguished.”).
29 Id. at 280 n.8. These principles have been cited repeatedly. See, e.g., Estate of
Trombetta v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-234, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 416 (2013); Ray v.
United States, 762 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985); Lazarus v. Comm’r, 513 F.2d 824, 829
(9th Cir. 1975); Becklenberg’s Estate v. Comm’r, 273 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1959); Cain
v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 185, 188 (1961). See also Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M.
Gans, Private Annuities and Installment Sales: Trombetta and Section 2036, 120 J. TAX’N
227, 228 (2014).
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a bond. The purchaser tears off the coupons, then sells the bond. She
dies before the bond matures. Both Ownership Divisibility and Obligation Divisibility seemingly apply. First, the coupons (annuity/income)
and bond (death benefit/remainder) may be owned and assigned separately, and in fact were assigned separately. In addition, the coupon
payments were a separate obligation and were not dependent on the
fluctuating value of the bond nor the profitability of the issuer; the obligation to pay the coupon interest was constant. On similar facts in Estate of Cooper v. Commissioner,30 the Tax Court held that the bond was
includible in the transferor’s estate under section 2036(a)(1).31 The Tax
Court did not address Fidelity-Philadelphia.
If Ms. Haines had kept the property used to purchase the Policies
and Annuities, or transferred such property and retained a right to income as the dissent indicates,32 such property would have all been includible in her estate. Prior to the enactment of section 2039, Ms.
Haines avoided estate tax through the form of her investments that the
Court concluded were independent. Cautious planners should focus on
establishing independence in an insurance/annuity transaction, mindful
of section 2039 and Montgomery.
D. EMPHASIZE FORM

AND

SUBSTANCE

Though nearly a century old, the Fidelity-Philadelphia decision is
precedent and important to the modern estate planner because its analysis is relevant to many transactions that are used today. People commonly trade property for payments over time, whether it be through
annuities/life insurance as in Fidelity-Philadelphia, a bond, an installment sale or otherwise. Will the investments be aggregated or
independent?
The principles in Fidelity-Philadelphia help guide the practitioner in
analyzing the recent I.R.S. focus on installment sales.33 For example,
installment sales should be structured so that both Ownership and Obligation Divisibility are present. Elements that may bolster this independence include sufficient equity in the trust34 and payments that do not
track income of property transferred.
30

74 T.C. 1373 (1980).
Id. at 1376.
32 Fid.-Philadelphia Tr. Co., 356 U.S. at 281 (Burton, J., dissenting).
33 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Petition for Redetermination at 10, Estate of Donald Woelbing v. Comm’r, T.C. No. 30261-13, stip. decision entered Mar. 24, 2016; Plaintiff’s Petition
for Redetermination at 8, Estate of Marion Woelbing v. Comm’r, T.C. No. 30260-13, stip.
decision entered Mar. 28, 2016.
34 See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 29, at 232-33 (discussing “seed money”).
31
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In choosing between an annuity/life insurance combination, a bond
or an installment sale, each of which could yield similar economic results, emphasis should be placed on achieving independence among the
payments and the property transferred, both in form and substance.

